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Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy:
A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and
Abbate v. United States
George C. Pontikes
INTRODUCTION
When a defendant is charged with conduct which violates both
federal and state criminal statutes, representing substantially the same
policies, then prosecution by one government for this violation should
bar a subsequent prosecution by the other for the same violation. This
position is contrary to that
THE AUTHOR (A.B., LL.B., Harvard Univer- taken by the United States Su-
sity) was a Ford Foundation Fellow in Crim- preme Court in Bartkus v.
inal Law at Northwestern University Law Illinois' and Abbate v. United
School during 1961-62. He is now a practicing
attorney in Chicago, Illinois and a member of States.2  The main purpose of
the Illinois and Federal District Court for the this article is to criticize these
Northern District of Illinois Bars. decisions, both in their theo-
retical underpinnings and in
their practical consequences.
THE DECISIONS IN BARTKUS AND ABBATE
Bartkus v. Illinois3 and Abbate v. United States' were decided in the
same term of the United States Supreme Court. Both involved the prob-
lem of successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments for
substantially the same offense. In both cases, the Court upheld the
second prosecution.
Bartkus involved the problem of a federal prosecution and acquittal
followed by a state prosecution and conviction. On December 18, 1953,
Alphonse Bartkus was tried for violation of The National Bank Robbery
Act.5 The indictment alleged that Bartkus robbed an Illinois savings
and loan association. He received a jury trial and was acquitted. It
appears that the federal authorities were upset by the decision, and the
1. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
3. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
4. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1948). The National Robbery Act provides in part: "(a) Whoever,
by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence
of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, or any savings and loan associa-
tion ......
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district judge reprimanded the jury for reaching this verdict.6 In January
of 1954, Bartkus was indicted by an Illinois grand jury, and was later
convicted for violation of the Illinois Robbery Act.' He was sentenced
to life imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act.8 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, and certiorari was granted
in the United States Supreme Court. There were essentially two issues
before the court: (1) Whether the state prosecution was a sham and in
fact a second federal prosecution, so that there was a violation of the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment;' ° and (2) Whether the
second prosecution by the state was a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment."
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, answered both of these questions in
the negative. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion. As to the
first issue, the Court held that the activities of the federal and state
prosecuting authorities showed a high degree of cooperation, but did
not establish that the Cook County prosecutor was a mere agent of the
federal prosecutor. 2 As to the second issue,'" the majority, relying to
some extent upon Palko v. Connecticut,4 argued that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not make the first ten amend-
ments automatically effective against the states. Justice Frankfurter re-
lied upon the content of the constitution of each state, either at the time
of ratification of the fourteenth amendment or at the time of admission
after the ratification, to show that the states did not envision the
inclusion of the first ten amendments within the due process clause,
since many did not include some of the provisions of the amendments in
their constitutions. A chart was attached to Justice Frankfurter's opinion
to demonstrate this point.'8 Since the fifth amendment was not included
within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, its double jeopardy clause did not bind the states.
Secondly, Justice Frankfurter discussed the question of whether the sec-
6. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 165 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 501 (1927). "Robbery is the felonious and violent taking of
money, goods or other valuable thing, from the person of another by force or intimidation."
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 602 (1957).
9. Illinois v. Bartkus, 7 IlI. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955).
10. "[Ior shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb ......
11. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law ...."
12. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959).
13. Id. at 124-26.
14. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). This case involved a Connecticut statute which allows the state
to appeal for error in criminal cases in which the defendant was acquitted. Appeal by the
prosecutor is not allowed in most states, or in the federal courts because it is thought that
the second trial would violate one's double jeopardy protection.
15. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 140-52 (1959).
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ond prosecution by Illinois offended the "concept of ordered liberty," as ex-
pressed in the ringing rhetoric of Justice Cardozo in the Palko case.'" He
found lengthy precedent17 which allowed a federal prosecution after a
state prosecution based upon the same conduct, culminating in United
States v. Lanza. 8  In the Lanza case, a federal conviction for violation of
the Volstead Act was upheld after a conviction under the state prohibition
statute. This was the first case where the Supreme Court expressly took
this position, their earlier pronouncements being dicta. The underlying
theory was definitively stated in Moore v. Illinois:9
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.
He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable
to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act
may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.2°
In other words, because the laws of two sovereigns were applicable, the
same act produced two offenses, so that Bartkus in the second prosecution
was not put in jeopardy for the "same" offense. Justice Frankfurter went
on to conclude that there was no good reason to overturn this precedent,
and two good reasons to uphold it: (1) there is a danger of federal
interference with the enforcement of state law, particularly in the area of
civil rights;2 and (2) there is a great deal of difficulty in determining
when the offenses are so much alike that one prosecution should bar
another. Therefore, because there were two sovereigns involved and
there was no policy reason for allowing a bar, the state prosecution did
not violate the due process clause.
Justices Black and Brennan wrote dissenting opinions with Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurring in both. Justice Black
argued two points: (1) the fifth amendment should be effective against
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and (2) allowing the second prosecution in this case would violate the
"concept of ordered liberty" since it transgresses a maxim which is funda-
mental to the whole of western civilization: no man shall be punished
twice for the same offense. He countered Justice Frankfurter's argument
that the federal and state governments would interfere with the enforce-
ment of each other's criminal law by pointing out that in fact this rarely
16. Id. at 127, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937). Justice Cardozo
used this concept as a criterion to determine whether the due process clause was violated.
17. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128-39 (1959).
18. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
19. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
20. Id. at 20.
21. Justice Frankfurter used as an example Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), in
which the defendant was charged with violating the Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948),
when he was guilty of the more serious crime of murder under Georgia law.
22. This argument follows Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
(1947).
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happens. If it did become a problem, however, the federal government
could pre-empt state action under the supremacy clause and deprive the
state courts of jurisdiction." Justice Brennan argued that the participa-
tion of the federal authorities in this state prosecution was so significant
that there was in substance a second federal prosecution. He pointed out
that the federal officers did everything except prosecute the case in the
state court. On that account, the fifth amendment should operate as a
bar to this prosecution 4
In the Abbate case, the situation was reversed. The Illinois prosecu-
tion preceded the prosecution in the federal district court. Justice Bren-
nan wrote the majority opinion in a 6-3 decision, Justices Black,
Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren dissenting.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of conspiring to destroy
the property of the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company.25
The fact that Abbate and another had helped to disband the conspiracy
by reporting it to the Chicago police is probably the reason they were
given only three month sentences.26 Thereafter, indictments were brought
in the United States District Court, charging the defendants with viola-
ting the Federal Conspiracy Act?' by conspiring to willfully and mali-
ciously injure communications controlled by the United States. 8 They
were convicted. Certiorari was granted on the question of whether this
second prosecution violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment.
The majority upheld the second conviction on the basis of Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Bartkus, arguing that each sovereign had the power
to punish for the violation of its law. Therefore, two offenses were com-
mitted by this one conspiracy. United States v. Lanza,29 which also in-
volved successive state and federal prosecutions, was followed. Justice
Brennan argued that if the dual sovereignty theory was overthrown, a
minor sentence by the state court might impinge upon a more serious in-
terest of the federal government. In this case, for example, Abbate was
23. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 139 (1919), which provides in part: "If any two or more
persons conspire or agree together. . . with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and
wickedly to injure the . . . property of another . . . they shall be deemed guilty of a con-
spiracy .... " The statute applies to conspiracies formed within the state to destroy property
outside the state. People v. Buckminster, 282 IIl. 177, 118 N.E. 497 (1917).
26. 359 U.S. 187, 188 (1959).
27. 18 U.S.C. 5 371 (1948), which provides in part: "If two or more persons conspire...
to commit any offense against the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined or imprisoned ......
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1948) which provides in part: "Whoever willfully or maliciously
injures or destroys any of the... property ... or any... means of communication, operated
or controlled by the United States ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned...
29. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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given only a three months sentence in Illinois when he might have been
sentenced to five years imprisonment under the federal statute.3" This
reasoning is essentially the reverse of that given by Justice Frankfurter in
Bartkus, where it was argued that federal prosecution might interfere with
state enforcement of state criminal law.
Justice Black dissented, with Justice Douglas and Chief Justice War-
ren concurring. Justice Black argued that the dual sovereignty theory
is not meaningful, and that the fifth amendement meant to establish a
broad policy to prohibit exactly this type of prosecution by the federal
government."' He based his opinion partly on the fact that Congress in
1789 rejected a wording of the double jeopardy clause which would have
restricted the protection to offenses under the laws of the United States. 2
In his opinion, this second action should have been barred by the fifth
amendment.
THE BASIS OF BARTKUS AND ABBATE IN PRECEDENT
An examination of the decisions dealing with the problem of suc-
cessive prosecutions for the same act by different sovereigns indicates a lack
of persuasive precedent. The United States Supreme Court, therefore,
should not have felt compelled to reach its decisions in Bartkus and
Abbate unless there were substantial policy reasons for arriving at these
decisions. This section will examine the relevant precedent.
English Common Law and American Revolution Development
First, let us turn to the murky waters of the English common law.
In Roy v. Thomas,3" the question before the court was whether an ac-
quittal of a felony in Wales barred a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense in an adjoining English county where statutes gave con-
current jurisdiction.34 The court, however, felt that since a general ses-
sions court was established in a later statute, 5 the common-law rule that
prior prosecution is a bar should apply. Similarly, in The King v.
Roche, " the court said by way of dictum that prior acquittal in a court in
30. Justice Brennan did not make it clear that the maximum under the Illinois statute is
also five years and that Abbate was given a small sentence because of his cooperation in dis-
banding the conspiracy.
31. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 187, 201-03 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
32. "No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punish-
ment or one trial for the same offense by any law of the United States." Id. at 204 n. 6,
quoting from 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 434 (1789). This proposed wording was changed con-
siderably before the present clause was adopted.
33. 1 Sid. 179, 82 Eng. Rep. 1043 (K.B. 1663).
34. 26 & 34 Hen. 8, c. 8.
35. 27 Hen. 8, c. 8.
36. 1 Leach 160, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas. 1775). See Grant, The Lanza Rule of Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309, 1318-20 (1932).
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the Cape of Good Hope would bar prosecution for the same crime in
England.
The Roche and Thomas cases have often been cited for the proposi-
tion that a judgment of a foreign court will bar prosecution in England.
But it is dear that there was only a single sovereign in these cases,
since both Wales and the Cape of Good Hope were under English
domination. The real question in these cases was whether courts having
concurrent jurisdiction under the same sovereign could prosecute twice
for the same crime. Therefore, the cases cannot be considered good au-
thority on the question of successive prosecutions between two sov-
ereigns.3
7
Rex v. Hutchinson,3" a habeas corpus proceeding, seems to be squarely
in point, holding that an acquittal of a murder charge in Portugal barred
a prosecution for that crime in England. The first two cases in which
this decision is reported held that under Hutchinson an adjudication
for the same crime under a foreign sovereign would bar prosecution in
England." In a third case, Gage v. Buckley,4" the court stated that Hutch-
inson did not support this position, but rather allowed judges in their
discretion to dismiss a second prosecution where there had already been
a prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction.
On the basis of these cases, Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus asserts that
the precedents are dubious. Furthermore, on the basis of Gage, he claims
that only a question of judicial discretion is involved.4 However, the
Roche case and a much later case, Regina v. Azzopardi,' adopt the origi-
nal interpretation of the two earliest cases. These cases, decided after the
Gage case, made it clear that the rule was fairly well established at the
English common law that a prior foreign prosecution for the same of-
fense barred prosecution in England.
With this background in mind, the position in the United States when
the Constitution was adopted can be examined. What is extremely interest-
ing here is that the first Congress, in 1789, rejected an amendment to
what later became the fifth amendment to the Constitution which would
have restricted the double jeopardy protection to federal offenses.4" It is
possible that this rejection was based upon the English common-law
37. Note, 35 IND. LJ. 444 (1960).
38. Reported in Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1726); Beak v.
Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B. 1688); Gage v. Bulkeley, Ridg. T.H. 263,
27 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1744).
39. Burrows v. Jemino, supra note.38; Beak v. Thyrwhit, supra note 38.
40. Ridg. T.HL 263, 27 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1744).
41. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128, n. 9 (1959).
42. 2 Mood. 366, 169 Eng. Rep. 115 (Cr. Cas. 1843).
43. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201-04 (1959) (dissenting opinion). See
note 32 supra.
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view that successive state-federal prosecutions for the same offense
should be barred. But this, admittedly, is speculative.
Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus points out that seven state courts had
discussed the problem before the decision in Fox v. Ohio,44 the first of the
landmark decisions cited in United States v. Lanza.45 Three courts de-
cided that prosecution by either state or federal authority barred prosecu-
tion by the other for the same offense; three decided there would be no
bar; and one had conflicting precedents.46 During this period, however,
there was only one Supreme Court opinion which discussed this issue,
Houston v. Moore.4" The Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute defining
the crime of failure to answer the call of the militia, which was also a
federal crime. The majority and concurring opinions seemed to hold, as
Justice Frankfurter said,48 that state or federal prosecution for the same
act would constitute a bar to a second prosecution only when a violation
of federal law has occurred. 9 Here, the state court had concurrent juris-
dition under the federal statute. Justice Story, dissenting, was disturbed
by the possibility of a double prosecution."0
From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that at the English
common law, there was fairly clear rule that foreign prosecution for the
same crime would bar prosecution in England. However, a conflict of
authority existed as to whether this rule applied between the states and
federal government.
Pre-Lanza Development
The next significant precedent is that upon which the decision in
United States v. Lanza5 is based. The first case is Fox v. Ohio." This
case held that the State of Ohio may punish the passing of counterfeit
money as a private cheat on the citizens of Ohio without colliding with
the exclusive federal power to punish the actual counterfeiting, as ex-
pressly granted in the United States Constitution.58 They were two dif-
ferent offenses.5 4 But the Court went on to say that even if the offenses
were the same, each government would have the right to prosecute and
44. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
45. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
46. 359 U.S. 121, 129-30 (1959).
47. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
48. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 129-30 (1959).
49. Id. at 130-35.
50. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1820) (dissenting opinion).
51. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
52. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
53. "To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current coin of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 6.
54. Fox v. Ohio 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
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punish independently for the same crime. 55 This statement is dictum
because the Court did not have a case of successive state-federal prosecu-
tions before it. The decision rested on the view that the Ohio statute
dealt with a different offense than that punishable by the federal govern-
ment. Although the dual sovereignty theory was not enunciated, the
Court seemed to assume it.
The next case which forms part of the precedent in Lanza is United
States v. Marigold.56 Citing the Fox case, the defendent challenged the
right of Congress to punish the circulation of counterfeit currency, as
distinct from its manufacture. The Court, however, found that Congress
could punish the circulation on the basis of its right to regulate currency,5"
not on its power to prevent counterfeiting." It also stated that the Fox
decision was not controlling, as it was limited to the right of the state
to prosecute the circulation as a private cheat.59 The Court reaffirmed the
right of the state and federal governments to prosecute where the same
act violates a statute of each without one prosecution barring the other."0
Again, the statement was dictum, since the issue was whether Congress
could punish the circulation of counterfeit money. Moreover, the issue
of successive prosecutions was not before the Court.
In Moore v. Illinois,61 the Court decided that an Illinois law against
the harboring of fugitive slaves was neither in conflict with a congression-
al law nor a constitutional provision. It found that preventing unwanted
persons from entering the state was a valid exercise of Illinois police
power. When the issue of double jeopardy was raised, the Court phrased
its answer in terms of dual sovereignty for the first time, stating that there
were two offenses because the same act violated the laws of two sov-
ereigns. 2 Since the issue in this case was whether Illinois could pass a
statute in an area in which Congress has spoken, and there was no ques-
tion of successive prosecutions, the statements of the Court are dicta.
United States v. Cruikshank3 is the next case in the precedent. The
discussion of the dual sovereignty concept is very tangential, since the
central question in the case was the sufficiency of a complaint under the
Civil Rights Act. This discussion is moot with reference to the central
issue.
55. Id. at 435.
56. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
57. "To coin money, regulate the value thereof .... U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 8.
58. United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 567-68 (1850).
59. Id. at 568.
60. Id. at 569.
61. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
62. Id. at 20.
63. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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Ex parte Siebold64 involved the constitutionality of a federal statute
controlling election procedure. The Court rejected the argument that
the statute was unconstitutional because the federal government did not
exclusively control the election procedure and thus did not pre-empt
state authority. In answer to the argument that there is a possibility of
double punishment for violation of both state and federal election laws,
the Court cited the now impressive dicta in Fox, Marigold, Moore, and
Cruikshank: when one act violates the statutes of two sovereigns, there
are two separate offenses.65 This discussion, however, is also dictum.
The next decision in the Lanza precedent is Cross v. North Carolina."
In this case, the defendant was prosecuted for circulating a false note.
He challenged the jurisdiction of the state court on the grounds that he
had violated a federal statute which outlawed making false entries on
the books of national banks. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the
jurisdiction of the state court, finding that circulating a forged note and
falsifying bank books were different offenses. Furthermore, there were
two offenses in any event, since the act violated the laws of two sov-
ereigns." Again, this statement is dictum, as the Court does not discuss
successive prosecutions.
In Pettibone v. United States,68 the defendants were charged with
conspiring to obstruct the administration of a federal court. The Court
found that the conspiracy alleged in the indictment did not violate both
state and federal stautes, but discussed the dual sovereignty theory only
peripherally for the purpose of contrast. The indictments against the
defendants were found to be insufficient.
The first case in which the dual sovereignty theory was necessary to
the decision was Crossley v. California.69 The defendant was convicted
in California for causing the death of an engineer by derailing a train.
He appealed on the grounds that since the train carried mail exclusively,
California had no jurisdiction. The Court answered this argument by
stating that because the state and federal governments were separate
sovereignties, each could punish an act which was an offense under its
law. The case is not in point, however, because the controlling issue
was whether California could punish an act which was punishable by
federal statute. The problem of successive prosecutions was never raised.
Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'r7° is the only case cited in Lanza which
dealt with successive federal-state prosecutions for the same offense. The
64. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
65. Id. at 389-91.
66. 132 U.S. 131 (1889).
67. Id. at 139.
68. 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
69. 168 U.S. 640 (1898).
70. 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
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defendant was charged with a violation of the Indiana Safety Appliance
Act for failure to provide safety equipment on its railroad cars. The
defendant had previously been convicted under the Federal Safety Ap-
pliances Act for the same omissions. The Court found that Congress
had pre-empted the field under the interstate commerce clause.71 The
cases which enunciated the dual sovereignty theory were distinguished
on the ground that in those cases the state had concurrent jurisdiction.
The fact that double prosecution was not allowed in this case, however,
did not seem to disturb Chief Justice Taft when he cited it in Lanza.
The next decision in the precedent is Gilbert v. Minnesota.2 The de-
fendant was charged with violating a Minnesota statute which outlawed
advocating against conscription for the United States Army. The consti-
tutionality of the statute was challenged on the ground that regulation
of the Army was exclusively vested in Congress. The Court replied that
it was a valid purpose of the state to build up the army and inspire
patriotism, so that there was virtually no possibility of conflict between
the state and federal governments.73 The Court then discussed'the dual
sovereignty concept, but only as an additional theoretical justification.
The decision was based primarily on the policy ground already stated.
Although punishment for the same offense was prescribed by Congress
in the Espionage Act of 1917, the possibility of successive prosecutions
is not mentioned. This case, therefore, is not in point.
In McKelvey v. United States, 4 which is the final case cited in the
Lanza precedent, the defendants were charged with the federal offense
of obstructing free passage over lands owned by the United States. They
argued that the federal statute was unconstitutional since it encroached
upon the police power of the state. The Court replied that the state
offense involved would be one of personal violence, a crime quite differ-
ent from the obstruction of free passage.75 Then the Court discussed the
dual sovereignty theory, observing that the same act may be an offense
against both sovereigns.76 This discussion is dictum because the issue
in the case is whether the federal statute encroached upon the police
power of the state. Moreover, the case is not in point because successive
prosecutions were not involved.
There is one case, Nielsen v. Oregon,7" which was not cited in Lanza,
but should have been. By act of Congress, Washington and Oregon had
71. Id. at 447.
72. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
73. Id. at 329-30.
74. 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
75. Id. at 358.
76. Id. at 358-59.
77. 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
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concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River. The precise issue in
the case was whether the state of Oregon could punish a crime malum
prohibitum under its statute, when the state of Washington authorized
the act, and the act was committed on the Washington side of the river.
The Court held that Oregon could not prosecute. In dictum, however,
it said that where an offense is prescribed by the laws of both states, prose-
cution by one will bar prosecution by the other. 8  No mention is made
of the precedent which spawned the dual sovereignty theory.
United States v. Lanza
With this background, a discussion of United States v. Lanza79 is now
possible. In this case, the defendants were charged with manufacturing,
transporting, and possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of the Vol-
stead Act. The defendants claimed that this prosecution was barred by a
prior prosecution under a Washington statute for manufacturing, trans-
porting, and possessing intoxicating liquor.80 They argued that this sec-
ond prosecution was in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, stated
that there was no violation of the fifth amendment. He dismissed the
argument that there was a single sovereignty here, since the state derived
its power of prohibition from the eighteenth amendment."' Furthermore,
before the passage of this amendment, the states had the power to pro-
hibit intoxicating liquor.8" He then argued that the fifth amendment
was inapplicable because the state and federal governments were two
sovereignties. Two offenses were involved, even though the acts were
identical in all other respects.8 3
In support of this view, all of the cases analyzed above were cited.
Chief Justice Taft made his conclusion unmistakably clear:
But it is not for us to discuss the wisdom of legislation, it is enough
for us to hold that, in the absence of special provision by Congress,
conviction and punishment in a state court under a state law for making,
transporting and selling intoxicating liquors is not a bar to a prosecution
in a court of the United States under the federal law for the same acts.84
What is disturbing about this decision is that it does not critically ex-
78. Id. at 320.
79. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
80. The federal government in its indictment had included two other counts. Id. at 379.
But it did not raise the point that two of its counts were not included in the state prosecution.
Thus the Court's decision apparently was based on its assumption that the indictments were
identical.
81. Id. at 381. "'The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII, § 2.
82. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381 (1922).
83. Id. at 382.
84. Id. at 385. Chief Justice Taft apparently was in error in referring to the third count
as "selling" instead of "possessing."
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amine its authority or give much of a policy discussion, except to remark
in a sentence that fines in state courts might undercut federal enforce-
ment. 5 Furthermore, the authority cited for the proposition that con-
viction in a state court is not a bar to prosecution in a federal court for
the same crime is weak for the following reasons: (1) In almost every
case on this point, the discussion is dictum. Either the Court is discussing
a problem that is not before it, (successive state-federal prosecutions) or
it is deciding whether there is concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over a
certain act. In these cases, the Court had already found that there is
concurrency on the ground that the federal and state offenses are distinct
in policy. (2) The Crossley case, where it might be argued that the dual
sovereignty determination was necessary to the decision, is not in point
because it dealt with the extent of the jurisdiction of a state court, not
successive state-federal prosecutions. (3) The fact that the Southern
Ry. case disallowed a state prosecution after a federal conviction for
exactly the same offense is ignored by the Court, and (4) the Nielsen
case is not cited. The majority also misunderstood the original purpose
of the eighteenth amendment. At the time the amendment was passed,
authorities believed that Congress had not intended it to allow for suc-
cessive state-federal prosecutions.s6 The Lanza decision, therefore, can
only be described as extremely unsatisfactory.
After Lanza, the dual sovereignty doctrine receded into the back-
ground. It was reaffirmed, however, in Herbert v. Louisiana,7 a case
very similar to Lanza. The theory was not re-examined until Bartkus and
Abbate.
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that there was no dear
and binding precedent which forced the Court to allow successive state-
federal prosecutions for the same offense in Bartkus and Abbate. The
English precedent seems to go the other way, and the American prece-
dent is contradictory and inconclusive, there being only a single holding,
Lanza, based on unsatisfactory authority. Justice Frankfurter put the
matter quite well in his dissent in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.:
When it appears that a challenged doctrine has been uncritically ac-
cepted as a matter of course by the inertia of repetition - has just
"grow'd" like Topsy - the Court owes it to the demands of reason,
on which judicial law-making power ultimately rests for its authority,
to examine its foundations and validity in order appropriately to assess
claims for its extension 88
The author can add nothing to that.
85. Id. at 385.
86. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUm. L. REV. 1309, 1311
(1932).
87. 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
88. 362 U.S. 539, 551 (1960).
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CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BARTKUS AND ABBATE IN LIGHT OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION
The rule announced in Bartkus and Abbate violates the policy of pro-
tection against double jeopardy and should be barred on that account.
The argument will be developed primarily in terms of the interaction of
the dual sovereignty theory with the double jeopardy protection. Once
the analysis is complete, it will be applied to the particular decisions in
Bartkus and Abbate.
Dual Sovereignty Theory vs. Double Jeopardy Protection
First, it is necessary to delineate the policy embodied in the protection
against double jeopardy. At the English common law, the plea of
auterfois convict or auterfois acquit would have been a good plea in bar
to a present prosecution if a prior prosecution was for the same offense.89
The double jeopardy doctrine was later adopted in the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution and in the constitutions of most of the
states, the rest adopting it as a matter of common law.9" What is the
policy behind this protection? Basically, the prohibition has the purpose
of avoiding multiple prosecution and multiple punishment for the same
offense.9' Although it may not be evident at first glance, these are dis-
tinct policy considerations. For example, a defendant may be subject to
successive prosecutions for the same offense without being once con-
victed. This violates the first policy consideration. On the other hand,
he may be convicted in a single prosecution on a multiple-count indict-
ment, each count charging the same offense. Consecutive sentences, one
for each count, would transgress the second policy aspect.
Under the English common law, it was not clear whether there was
protection against multiple punishment. Although it might be argued
that no such policy existed, the policy was there, but was never articula-
ted because there was no distinction between act and offense until late
in common-law development. There was a single count charged in the
indictment for which there was either a single punishment or an acquit-
tal.9" Moreover, the bar to a second prosecution for the same act, in ef-
fect, barred a second punishment. This policy never had to be articulated
because judges were never faced with the question of a second punish-
ment apart from a second prosecution. 3 The modern use of the multiple
89. 2 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §5 378-79 (Jones ed. 1916).
90. For a list of state constitutions with the double jeopardy provision, see Kneier, Prosecu-
tion Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 COENELL L.Q. 201,
202 n.4 (1931).
91. For an excellent discussion on this point see Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339-44 (1956).
92. Id. at 341-43.
93. The maxim nemo debt bis puniri pro uno delicto was recognized at the English common
law. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lee, 4 Co. Rep. 43a, 76 Eng. Rep. 989 (K.B. 1590).
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count indictment brought the problem of multiple punishment to the
foreground.
Each of these basic policy considerations needs to be analyzed a little
further. Why do we want to avoid multiple prosecution? First, there
is the desire to avoid harassing the defendant because of the stigma
associated with repeated charges. Citizens should suffer no more than
a single intrusion for a single alleged infraction. Closely allied with this
reasoning is the second consideration: the citizen should not suffer from
fear of future prosecution. Once the matter is finally adjudicated, he
should have the psychological security of knowing that the charge cannot
be raised again. Third, there is a waste of the resources, both of the
state and the citizen, if the same charge is repeatedly litigated. Finally,
the state should not be given the power to continually prosecute until it
finds a friendly tribunal which will convict. 4  These then, are the rea-
sons for prohibiting multiple prosecution.
The underlying reasoning for protection against multiple punishment
is that if multiple punishment is allowed, there can be no rule of law. A
rule of law presupposes that each defendant will receive the punishment
established according to certain standards and limitations which cannot
be superseded. Thus, if armed robbery has a maximum sentence of
twenty years, that is a definite limitation which guarantees that no one
convicted of that crime will receive a sentence of more than twenty years.
The rule of law places a check upon the judge so that he cannot act arbi-
trarily. If multiple punishment were allowed, these limitations could be
transgressed at the will of the judge by giving more than one punishment
for the same crime. A prohibition against multiple punishment is a
necessary element in any legal system which claims to be based upon the
concept of a rule of law. 5
If this discussion properly formulates the reasons for the double
jeopardy protection, is it not clear that the dual sovereignty theory as
applied in Bartkus and Abbate is inconsistent with all of these policy
considerations? It may be argued that because there are two sovereigns
there are two offenses so that all of the considerations of the protection
against double jeopardy are irrelevant. This, however, is a misconcep-
tion. If statutes of both state and federal governments are based on sub-
stantially the same policy, a single act is violative of a single policy, and
thereby can constitute only one offense. Two policies, which are other-
wise substantially similar, cannot be distinguished merely on the basis of
different sovereigns. In such a situation, the considerations of the pro-
94. The first three are expounded in Comment, 65 YALE LJ. 339, 340-41 (1956). The
fourth is found in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
95. Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
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tection against double jeopardy are very relevant, precisely because both
statutes embody policies which are substantially the same.
When the term "policy" is used here, it is meant to be synonymous with
what might often be called the purpose of the statute. If it can be found
that both statutes aim to prevent essentially the same act or omission,
then the purpose or policy of both statutes will be substantially similar.
For example, sovereign A and sovereign B might both declare that a
trespassory taking and carrying away of personal property with intent to
permanently deprive the owner of it is a crime. How can it be said that
there are two offenses when both statutes prescribe the same offense, or,
to put it another way, the purposes are identical? But, it might be said
that each has a different "interest." If the policies of both statutes are
substantially similar, what is the difference between the "interest" of one
sovereign and that of the other? To continue the above example, if
sovereign A captures, prosecutes, and convicts or acquits a defendant
charged with this crime, the interest of B is fully satisfied as well. What
other "interest" can B have? It appears to be clear that under these cir-
cumstances there can be only a single offense for the purposes of the pro-
tection against double jeopardy.
If there is only a single offense when two sovereigns have statutes
with closely related policies, does the mere fact of two sovereigns have
any further theoretical significance?9" It is clear the answer must be no.
This directs attention to the basic problem: the traditional definition of
crime in the Anglo-Saxon system. Both at the English common law
and in the United States, a crime has been classically defined as "A
breach of the sovereign's peace."97 This has not been the view in other
legal systems.
Quite a different conception prevails in the non-English-speaking
world. There a crime is laid, not as a breach of the sovereign's peace,
but as a breach of the offender's absolute duty. Thus in Scotland, where
the practice is founded on the Roman Law, the indictment does not
conclude "against the peace and dignity of the crown," but instead
recites that the accused "ought to be punished with the pains of the law
in order to deter others from committing like crimes in all time
coming." 98
In other words, where the statutes have substantially similar policies,
and one act violates the two, the argument that there are two crimes
because of dual sovereignty hangs upon a metaphysics of what constitutes
a crime. In this situation, if crime is defined without reference to a
sovereign, the fact that there are two sovereigns loses all relevance.
96. The problem of the interference of one sovereign in practice with another will be dis-
cussed in the next section of the paper. See p. 720 infra.
97. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLtIM. L. REV. 1309, 1316
(1932).
98. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 85 (1930).
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It is obvious that the phrase "substantially similar policy" has been
deliberately used in the discussion, instead of another expression, such
as the "same policy." The reason that such wording has been adopted
is simply because it is often difficult to decide when statutes do and do
not have similar policies. This difficulty disturbed Justice Frankfurter
in the Bartkus case. 9" There may be decisions where the two statutes
do not have exactly the same policy, but where the policy is so similar
that prosecution by one sovereignty should bar prosecution by another.
It might be argued that this very difficulty should be a conclusive reason for
not letting the first prosecution be a bar. However, this process is very
similar to the decision which a court must make as to whether a certain
case comes within a certain law. To some extent, it must define the
policy of the law involved to make the decision. This process is often
extremely difficult and is likely to give rise to the celebrated "hard case."
If the courts must define policy in this regard, there is no reason why
it cannot be done to decide whether the policies of two statutes are
substantially similar. The problem of "drawing the line" is a universal
one in legal analysis.
In bringing the problem to bear on a concrete situation, the case of
Screws v. United States'"0 should be analyzed. Citing Screws, the ma-
jority of the Court in both Bartkus and Abbate felt that unless the dual
sovereignty theory was applied, prosecution by either the state or the
federal government would bar prosecution by the other.' 01 But, would
this be so? If the preceding argument is accepted, the answer is dearly
no.
Sheriff Screws was charged with beating to death a Negro prisoner
in his custody. Under Georgia law, he would probably have been guilty
of murder. He was prosecuted by the federal authorities under what is
now the Civil Rights Act.0 2 Each statute had a distinct policy con-
sideration. The Georgia law had the policy of preventing the taking of
life, in this case by the individual, Screws. The federal statute was
designed to prevent Screws, as the representative of the state's police
power, from depriving the Negro defendant of certain rights guaranteed
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The state policy against
homicide, and the federal policy against allowing states to deprive in-
99. See discussion at p. 701-02 supra.
100. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
101. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 195 (1959).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948), which provides in part: "Whoever, under color or any law,
•.. subjects any inhabitant.., to the deprivation of any rights ... secured ... by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States ... by reason of his color, or race... shall be fined or
imprisoned...."
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dividuals of certain rights on account of race or color were both trans-
gressed by this one beating. Screws, in fact, committed two offenses.
A variation of the hypothetical might make the situation clearer.
Suppose Screws left his jail, and during this period the Negro was
lynched. He left the jail knowing that this would happen to avoid facing
the mob. He would probably be violating the Civil Rights Act, but
would probably not be guilty of murder under Georgia law.' On the
other hand, suppose that he beat a white prisoner to death. Then, he
would probably be guilty of murder, but not guilty of violating the Civil
Rights Act. In these two situations, only one of the statutes is being vio-
lated - only one policy is being transgressed. But in the actual case, the
single act violated both policies.
To take a third example, imagine that Georgia had a law, comparable
to the Civil Rights Act, which made it a crime for a state officer to
deprive any person of any rights guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution
or Georgia law on account of race or color. Screws could then be subject
to a two-count indictment: one court charging murder, the other
charging deprivation of the defendant's Georgia rights. There would
be no problem of double jeopardy here because he has violated two
statutes embodying two separate state policies. By analogy, the same
rule would apply to successive state-federal prosecutions if the dual
sovereignty approach is discarded.
The following is an example of a "hard case." Suppose prohibition
returned and there was a state statute prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, or
possession" of alcohol in addition to the Volstead Act, which also pro-
hibited the "manufacture, sale, or possession" of alcohol. X is charged
by the state with selling alcohol illegally. He is convicted. The federal
government then charges him with possession under the Volstead Act.
The only evidence is that on a certain day, X sold so many gallons of
bathtub gin to Y. The federal prosecutor argues that the state prosecuted
X for sale and not possession of alcohol. The latter is a separate
offense because there are two policies in the act: one to prevent the
sale, the other possession. The problem is that although Congress has
established two policies, in this particular case the two merge. Since
sale and possession are indistinguishable, they merely represent two
names for the same act the federal government seeks to prevent. This
author believes the best formulation is that which allows a separate
prosecution and punishment for possession only if it is not an incident of
a sale. A similar problem arose in successive federal prosecutions under
the Volstead Act."0 4
103. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
104. See Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 535 (1932).
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From the above analysis, therefore, we may conclude that when the
same act violates statutes or laws of two sovereigns, and these laws em-
body substantially the same policy, there is a single offense for the pur-
pose of the double jeopardy protection; the fact of a dual sovereignty
has no significance. In light of the above discussion, it is clear that if
the state should prosecute first, a federal prosecution should be barred
by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. What if the state
should attempt the second prosecution? Should it be barred under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment? A dichotomy exists
because the due process clause does not make the double jeopardy clause
automatically effective against the states. This was dearly indicated in
Palko v. Connecticut."'
It might be argued that the fifth amendment, as well as the rest of
the Bill of Rights, should be part of the due process clause, as Justice
Black has maintained since his dissent in Adamson v. California."°6 If
this were the case, the problem would disappear since the standard in
both the fifth amendment and the fourteenth amendment would be the
same. This question, however, is beyond the scope of this article and
cannot be justly treated in a few sentences. The author only wishes to
comment that without more than a cursory look into the question, in the
general area of the double jeopardy protection, there is no necessity of
having a different standard for the states and the federal government.
Assuming, however, that the fifth amendment is not applicable
through the fourteenth, should the due process clause prohibit a state
prosecution after a federal prosecution for violation of statutes represent-
ing substantially similar policies? The author would argue that it should.
If the federal government cannot prosecute after a state has prosecuted
for the same offense, the prohibition is easily avoided by having the
federal authorities prosecute first. In effect, there would be no protection
at all. It does not appear sensible to allow the result to hinge upon
who prosecutes first. Furthermore, this result is much more shocking
to one's moral conscience than the result in Palko v. Connecticut,107 and
as in Palko,-should be considered a violation of the "concept of ordered
liberty."
In Palko, a Connecticut statute, which allowed the prosecution to
appeal an acquittal for error, was challenged on the ground that it
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice
Cardozo found that there was no violation.
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him
a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?
105. 302 U.S. 319, 323-25 (1937).
106. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
107. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Does it violate those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?" .. . .
The answer surely must be "no."' 08
When the prosecution is allowed to appeal for error, the second trial
is in a real sense a continuation of the first. The various considerations
of the prohibition against multiple prosecution do not have a direct
application because the first trial is not finished until the judgment is
error-free. This really depends upon one's differentiation between a final
adjudication and a new prosecution. But there are independent reasons
for allowing the prosecution to appeal, namely, that under the existing
law, there can be a second prosecution after a successful appeal by the
defendent - this is logically indistinguishable from allowing a second
trial after appeal by the prosecution; and that defense counsel "runs
wild" in trial, knowing that in most states if there is an acquittal, the
prosecution cannot appeal for error because of double jeopardy protection.
These considerations do not apply when the state seeks to prosecute after
a federal prosecution because the state can prosecute after non-appealed,
error-free judgment. This appears to the author to be much harsher
and violative of "fundamental principles." It is a question of how
much is too much, and the author thinks this is too much.109
The conclusion of the discussion is this: When a single act violates a
state and a federal statute, such statutes embodying very similar policies,
prosecution by one government should bar prosecution by the other,
either under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment or the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO BARTKUS AND ABBATE
If we assume this conclusion as a general consideration, how does it
apply specifically to Bartkus and Abbate? First, looking at Bartkus, it
would appear that the policy of the Illinois Robbery Act is almost identi-
cal with that of the National Bank Robbery Act."0  Both seek to avoid
the taking of property by threats of violence, although the federal act is
limited to banks and savings associations. There are, however, two
possible arguments which demonstrate the policy differences in the
statutes. It might be said that the federal statute is limited to banks
and savings institutions because the federal government has an interest in
insuring the soundness of the fiscal system, while the states have an
108. Id. at 328 (citations omitted).
109. The reaction of each individual depends upon his own sensitivity. Reason has rela-
tively little to do with it. The author must confess that the Supreme Court would probably
not agree with him, in light of Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1957) and Ciucci v.
Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1957).
110. See notes 5 & 7 supra.
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interest in property. Therefore, these statutes in fact represent two
policies, and separate offenses are involved.
However, this argument cannot stand. The connection between a
sound fiscal system and the robbing of a bank is so remote that it is a
rationalization to say that there is a federal interest here. It is entirely
ephemeral. The federal statute was not passed to safeguard the fiscal
system, but to aid the states in capturing and punishing persons violating
their laws. The argument actually confuses the purpose of the statute
with the congressional power to enact the statute. Since the federal
government can act only upon the basis of an express or implied power
in the Constitution, Congress must limit the scope of this legislation to
financial institutions, so that it stays within its power to control and
regulate the currency and its value.'1 ' Certainly, the purpose of the legis-
lation is to protect the larcenous taking of property by intimidation, but
Congress is limited by the constitutional power." Even if it is agreed
that the federal government's interest in the fiscal system is a genuine
one, there is still no separate offense under the federal statute because
the protection of the fiscal system is a policy interest in the general
protection of property. To say that the policy of protecting property
has been adopted is only to give a short-hand expression for the varied
reasons for adopting this policy, one of which may be the protection of
the fiscal system. Therefore, the offense is the same under both statutes.
Moreover, it might be argued that in Bartkus, the state of Illinois
has a separate interest, since after this conviction, Bartkus would be sub-
ject to the Habitual Criminal Act."' This argument has no relevance
because the question is: What is the Illinois policy under its robbery stat-
ute? The Habitual Criminal Act comes into consideration only after
there is a decision as to whether there can be a prosecution under the
prior statute.
The Abbate case is more difficult to rationalize. Both the Illinois and
federal conspiracy statutes have the policy of prohibiting conspiracies
formed for the purpose of destroying property."4  The federal statute
is framed in terms of injuring any property of any communications sys-
tem controlled by the United States. This, of course, is based utimately
on the interstate commerce clause, since the United States can control
only interstate communications. What makes this case more difficult
is the fact that the federal prosecutor introduced evidence to show that
111. See note 60 supra.
112. This point is readily observable in statutes like the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948).
It is based on the interstate commerce clause, but it is obviously aimed at pimping or pander-
ing. It can be no more than a metaphor to say that Congress wanted to keep interstate com-
merce clear of women used for immoral purposes.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 602 (1883).
114. See statutes cited in notes 25, 27, & 28 supra.
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the facilities of Southern Bell were a part of the communication system
used for the defense of the nation, thus supporting the argument for a
distinct federal policy. But, as stated above, the general policy might
embody a number of policy considerations responsible for its adoption.
For example, one of the reasons for adopting a criminal statute against
conspiring to injure property was the safe-guarding of defense communi-
cations. Both statutes, nevertheless, represent a policy of preventing such
conspiracies, regardless of the reasons for adopting this policy. There-
fore, the prior state prosecution should have barred the federal one.
LACK OF PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT
THE THEORY OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
The last section has shown that prosecution by state or federal au-
thorities should bar prosecution by the other where the same act violates
statutes of each, with substantially the same policy. Thus, the next ques-
tion to consider is whether there is any practical need for the dual
sovereignty concept. There would be such a necessity if it could be
shown that federal and state authorities might interfere with the en-
forcement activities of one another. Some discussion will show that no
such problems exist.
First, it seems dear that state and federal authorities work closely with
one another.'15 However, if any antagonism should develop, both the
federal and state governments have powerful weapons with which to
protect the effectiveness of their law enforcement. The federal govern-
ment has the supremacy clause, and the states have their respective repre-
sentatives in Congress. Therefore, this author must conclude that there
is no practical necessity for upholding the dual sovereignty theory where
both statutes seek to prevent the same offense.
THE RESULT OF COMBINING THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
THEORY WITH THEORIES OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PROTECTION IN STATE LAW
The purpose of this section is to analyze the practical consequences
of the Bartkus and Abbate decisions. To do this, they must be con-
sidered in light of the "same evidence" test and the rule that successive
prosecutions by a state and a municipality for the same offense are not
in violation of the state prohibition against double jeopardy. Initially,
however, there must be an explanation of the same evidence test and the
rule that successive state-municipal prosecutions do not put a defendant
in double jeopardy.
115. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 n. 1 (1959).
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The Same Evidence Test
The "same evidence" test is the criterion used by a great number of
states when determining whether a second indictment charges the same
offense charged in an earlier prosecution. The test was first announced
in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott."6
These cases establish the principle, that unless the first indictment
were [sic] such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon [sic] by
the proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal
on the first indictment can be no bar to the second.117
This formulation was used to by-pass the technical rule of variance.
The test has been employed in this country to determine the intent of the
legislature in defining various offenses. The "same evidence" test, how-
ever, has been defined narrowly, so that in many states, double jeopardy
protection has been greatly impaired. Any slight variation of the facts
is called new evidence, although, reasonably, the offense charged is the
same. One of the primary reasons for this situation is the rule in most
states that the prosecution cannot appeal for error from an acquittal."'
One of the most flagrant examples of the appalling results produced
by this test is the case of Johnson v. Commonwealth."' Defendant par-
ticipated in seventy-five hands of poker from nine in the evening until
one in the morning. He was convicted for violation of the gaming laws
on the basis of the first hand and was being charged in a second prosecu-
tion for the same violation on the basis of the second hand. The court
held that each hand was itself a complete offense, so that conviction or
acquittal on the first hand would not bar a prosecution for the second. 2'
He could then be prosecuted and punished for all seventy-five hands. Al-
though few decisions have reached this point, there are many odd de-
cisions on record.'
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of this test as
not being violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Hoag v. New Jersey,'22 the defendant robbed four persons
116. 2 Leach 816, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Cr. Cas. 1796).
117. The King v. Undercomb & Abbott, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Cr. Cas. 1796). The
first indictment charged breaking and entering and taking property away. It failed because
of a variance between the proof and the indictment. The second charged breaking and enter-
ing with intent to steal, which was upheld as a different offense.
118. See generally Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MNN.
L. REV. 805 (1937); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513 (1949); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
119. 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
120. Id. at 316, 256 S.W. at 389.
121. See Commonwealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass. 1 (1868) (defendant was charged with
embezzling five bonds; the court held that he had committed five offenses because each bond
was new evidence); Barton v. State, 23 Wis. 587 (1869) (five drafts of forged notes all
uttered at once constituted five offenses under the "same evidence" test).
122. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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simultaneously. After being acquitted for robbing three of the alleged
victims, the Supreme Court upheld the prosecution for the fourth. Dur-
ing the same term, in Ciucci v. Illinois,12" the Court upheld a third con-
viction of a defendant who was charged with the murder of his wife and
three children. The first conviction was for murdering his wife, the
second for murdering his oldest child, and the third for murdering an-
other child. The prosecution was seeking the death penalty, which it
finally obtained after the third conviction. The evidence in each case
was the same. The only difference in the cases was the name of the
victim. The Court upheld the Hoag and Ciucci decisions on the grounds
that the double jeopardy protection was not a part of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and furthermore, there was no fun-
damental unfairness. Thus far, the Court has not found an unconstitu-
tional use of the "same evidence" test.
124
Successive State-Municipal Prosecutions
The second theory in regard to state double jeopardy protection al-
lows successive municipal-state prosecutions for the same offense. 125 This
rule is followed in a majority of the states. For example, a city may
prosecute a violation of its municipal code for keeping a disorderly house,
and the state may also prosecute under its statute for the same violation.
There are two rationales to support this position. One states that the city
and the state are separate sovereignties, so that there are two offenses.
This seems ridiculous since the municipality is ordinarily the creation of
the state. The second theory is that the action by the city is not really a
criminal action, but more like a civil action. The municipality, as a
corporation, is suing to recover its debt by collection of a fine. This also
seems dubious, particularly if a jail sentence is part of the judgment. The
Supreme Court has not passed upon the question of whether or not this
double prosecution violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but in the light of Hoag and Ciucci, it appears unlikely that
it does.
These fundamentals now make it possible to construct a hypothetical.
X, president of a local free-love society, is accused of stealing six pack-
ages of stamps from the local post office, each worth twenty dollars.
City Z in Illinois prosecutes X for violation of the provision of its munici-
pal code which reads: "Anyone who steals the property of another, and
123. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
124. The same test is used in federal prosecutions. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), it was used more
sensibly. Here, a single shotgun blast which wounded two federal marshals simultaneously
was considered a single offense.
125. Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16
CORNELL L.Q. 201 (1931).
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the value of such property is more than ten dollars, shall be subject to a
one hundred dollar fine, or a jail sentence of not more than thirty days,
or both." He is fined and given the maximum sentence. Then, X suf-
fers six separate prosecutions under Illinois law for violation of the
larceny statutes.' There are six prosecutions because the stealing of
each package is a separate offense under the statute, each package being
new evidence in every prosecution. 2 ' Double jeopardy does not exist
because the city suit is civil in nature. 2 ' For each conviction defendant is
sentenced to ten years in jail, the sentences running consecutively. Final-
ly, the federal authorities prosecute him for stealing property used by the
Post Office.'29 He is fined and given a three-year sentence to run con-
secutively with those of the state.
The above situation can arise when the rule in Bartkus and Abbate
is coupled with the rule of the Hoag and Ciucci decisions. The state
prosecutions are probably valid under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment; the dual sovereignty theory allows the federal prose-
cution. There would probably be ready agreement that if this should
happen, it would be intolerably unfair. Since all the statutes proscribe
the same act, all policy aspects of the double jeojardy protection
would be violated. Finally, the number of possible prosecutions is left
in the hands of the prosecutor, a situation which could involve the
danger of persecution. This could be the case in the above hypothetical,
X being president of a local free-love society. This result demonstrates
the reason why the rule in Bartkus and Abbate should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It seems apparent that successive state-federal prosecutions for viola-
tions of state and federal statutes with substantially the same policy
should be barred. The fact that there is no binding precedent prior to
the Bartkus and Abbate cases; that allowance of successive prosecutions
in such circumstances dearly violates the protection against double
jeopardy; that the practical problem of state-federal interferences with
one another's law enforcement is minimal; and that the dual sovereignty
theory combined with certain state practices might lead to unjust results,
leads to that single conclusion.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 387, 389 (1951). § 387 provides in part: "Larceny is
the felonious stealing ... the personal goods of another." § 389 provides in part: "Every
person convicted of larceny if the property stolen exceeds the value of fifteen dollars ... shall
be imprisoned ... not less than one, nor more than ten years .... "
127. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), where the "same evidence" test was em-
ployed in its extreme form.
128. City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912).
129. 18 U.S.C. 5 1707 (1948) which provides in part: "Whoever steals ... any property
used by the Post Office Department... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both [if the property stolen exceeds $100 in value) ...."
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